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Impact of the Pupino decision on EU Law 
Maria Fletcher 
Introduction 
Well over a decade on from the decision, this chapter considers the significance of the 
Pupino1 judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU or ‘the Court’) today 
from an EU perspective.  Pupino is famous for having extended the so-called principle of 
“indirect effect” to the then third pillar, which dealt with Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal matters (PJCC). More precisely, it held that ‘the principle of conforming legislation’ 
was ‘binding in relation to framework decisions adopted in the context of Title VI of the 
Treaty on European Union.’2 The duty, as the Court has made clear, remains a valid 
constitutional tool for achieving an understanding and application of EU that coheres with 
domestic law. It is by its very nature, a flexible and limited tool which allows for 
inconsistencies between two connected legal orders to be ironed out gently and quietly at 
the behest of national authorities ‘as far as possible’. This chapter will recall the key features 
of the principle as outlined by Pupino; identify how that principle has evolved in later case-
law; and evaluate its place in the considerably different post-Lisbon context of EU PJCC and 
in light of the peculiar qualities of the field of criminal law.  It is well known that the changes 
effected by the Treaty of Lisbon were transformative in the field of EU crime and policing, 
particularly in the sense of absorbing the agenda into a largely Communitarian 
constitutional framework and it is equally well recognised that national criminal justice 
systems represent and actively reinforce the sovereign authority of the state. 
A review of cases in which the Court considers the indirect legal effects of PJCC instruments 
post Pupino and post Lisbon essentially reveals both a continued commitment to this 
principle, and a full alignment of its fleshed out terms – scope and limits – with the principle 
as developed more generally in EU law.  From one perspective, this is arguably less 
controversial and in principle simpler in the post Lisbon era of enhanced constitutional 
legitimacy and rights protection3, especially when compared to the Pupino era when it 
appeared that the Court had effectively ignored the added sensitivity of criminal law 
matters as reflected in third pillar constitutional and institutional framework.  Nevertheless, 
another perspective is that national criminal law remains a highly sensitive field imbued 
with uniquely protected principles and safeguards for individuals. Any constitutional 
principle which compels national judges to adopt an interpretation of national criminal law 
that it would otherwise not have to, but for EU law – the primary rationale of which is to 
                                                          
1 C-105/03 Maria Pupino ECR [2005] I-5285 
2 ibid [43] 
3 The Treaty of Lisbon confirmed the legal status, equivalent to the EU treaties, of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights OJ 2010 C83/2, which includes the right to liberty and security (Article 6), the right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article 47), the presumption of innocence and right of defence (Article 48), 
principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49) and the right not to be 
tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence (Article 50). 
make EU law more effective in national legal orders – is likely to be met with some 
resistance. This tension is bound to be further exaggerated where criminal law itself is being 
‘Europeanised’ because not only is there more scope for EU law to impinge on domestic 
criminal law, but there is more scope for substantial clashes, where for instance cornerstone 
principles, such as legality, diverge or emerge at the EU level only incrementally.  
As predicted by many commentators, serious disruption to the balance of rights in national 
criminal justice systems as a direct consequence of EU level intervention would almost 
certainly provoke direct challenges from national courts to the authority of EU instruments 
adopted in this field and to the scope and exercise of EU competences.4  To some extent this 
has played out,5 but through this direct dialogue there are some tentative but important 
signs that the Court is mindful of the national sensitivities and peculiarities of criminal law 
and further, that it is recognising its own enhanced responsibility in this field. These 
tentative conclusions emerge from a reading of two cases in particular -  the Caronna6 case 
and the Taricco ‘saga’7 – where we see first, the CJEU attributing particular importance to 
the position and scope of fundamental rights and safeguards in EU law and between EU law 
and national law and second,  an acknowledgement of the pressures on national judges and 
the limits of what can be achieved through national judiciaries when the legal worlds of EU 
(criminal) and national criminal law collide.  
These developments indicate an evolving relationship between the EU and domestic legal 
orders in the field of criminal law as well as articulating a fuller understanding of EU criminal 
law and crucially, the place of rights within it.  Through direct, constructive and co-operative 
dialogue – possible thanks to the now full jurisdiction of the CJEU over PJCC and heeding the 
new and extended duties and principles articulated in Article 4(2) and 4(3) TEU8 respectively  
-  one might hope to see more mutual understanding and accommodation as between EU 
                                                          
4 See for instance Jo Shaw, 'One or Many Constitutions?: The Constitutional Future of the European Union in 
the 2000s from a Legal Perspective', (2007), Vol 52, Scandinavian Studies in Law, 393 
5 For instance the various constitutional challenges to the European Arrest Warrant at both the national and 
EU level; See eg E. Guild (ed) Constitutional Challenges to the EAW (TMC Asser, 2006) and C-303/05 Advocaten 
voor de Wereld [2007] ECR I-3633. More recently see C-105/14 Ivo Taricco and Others Grand Chamber, 
Judgment of 8 September 2015 (Taricco I) and C-42/17 M.A.S & M.B Grand Chamber, Judgment of 7 December 
2017 (Taricco II) 
6 Case C-7/11 Caronna [2012] OJ 2011/C 80 /26 
7 C-105/14 Ivo Taricco and Others Grand Chamber, Judgment of 8 September 2015 (Taricco I) and C-42/17 
M.A.S & M.B Grand Chamber, Judgment of 7 December 2017 (Taricco II) 
8 Article 4(2) TEU reads: ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.’  Article 4(3) TEU reads: ‘The Union shall respect the 
equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law 
and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.’  
and national law and constitutional and criminal law. This, would certainly helpfully inform 
our understanding of the limits of the scope of the consistent interpretation duty upon 
national judges and probably also encourage a more active use of it. Today then, the Pupino 
principle remains valid in theory but poses significant challenges to national judges in 
practice. We need to look beyond it to better understand its scope and contribution. 
Pupino: the judgment, the critique, the context  
The Pupino judgment of June 2005 addressed for the first time the question of the effects 
within national legal orders of measures adopted under the powers of Title VI of the Treaty 
on European Union dealing with police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (also 
known as the ‘third pillar’). In holding that national judges have a duty to interpret national 
law insofar as possible in conformity with third pillar instruments, known as framework 
decisions -  and specifically in that case a Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in 
Criminal Proceedings9 – the Court transposed a relatively mature constitutional doctrine 
developed within the framework of the first ‘Community’ pillar to the ‘third pillar’. This 
doctrine of conforming interpretation is often referred to as the principle ‘indirect effect’. It 
was first espoused by the Court in the case of Von Colson10 in 1984 and fleshed out in a 
number of ways by later cases.  
A brief reminder of facts and query in this case might be useful at this point. Ms Pupino, a 
children’s nursery teacher in Italy, was prosecuted for having allegedly used physical 
violence against children in her care. At the initial stage of the criminal proceedings the 
public prosecutor asked for the children to be heard out of court considering their age and 
vulnerability. Such special arrangement for taking evidence were permitted pursuant to the 
Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/JHA) but 
not permitted according to the relevant provisions of the Italian code of criminal procedure. 
Unhappy with the limited scope of national law, the Italian court sought to question its 
compatibility with the EU Framework Decision bearing in mind its duty to “interpret its 
national law in the light of the letter and spirit of Community provisions.” It consequently 
stayed national proceedings and requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU, in the course 
of which the CJEU confirmed the duty of conforming interpretation applies in respect of 
framework decisions. 
The Court based its finding on two familiar foundations plus two more. The “binding 
character” of framework decisions together with the duty of loyal or sincere cooperation 
provided the familiar Community law justificatory bases of the principle of conforming 
interpretation. These were supplemented by an effet utile argument linked to the limited 
jurisdiction of the Court to give preliminary rulings under the third pillar, namely that that 
jurisdiction would “be deprived of most of its useful effect if the duty of conforming 
                                                          
9 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings OJ [2001] L 82/1 (no longer in force.) 
10 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen ECR [1984] 1891 
interpretation did not exist.” And finally, it held that is “perfectly comprehensible” that the 
authors of the EU Treaty designed third pillar instruments to have similar legal effects to 
first pillar instruments in order to contribute effectively to the pursuit of the Union’s 
objectives. 
This was remarkable indeed at the time. Prior to the Pupino judgment it had been assumed 
that third pillar instruments were not capable of giving rise to any legal effects in domestic 
regimes, in part because of the distinctive institutional features of the third pillar and in part 
because the Treaty expressly declared that Framework Decisions ‘shall not entail direct 
effect.’11 So although framework decisions were similar in character to the Community 
legislative instrument – directives – in that they were binding on Member States and the 
manner in which they were to be implemented in domestic law was left to the Member 
States, they differed fundamentally from directives in that they did not give rise to rights or 
obligations which individuals could enforce before their national courts. Nonetheless, the 
Pupino judgment made clear that national courts were required to ‘take consideration of all 
the rules of national law and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording 
and purpose of the Framework Decision.’12   
In terms of scope of the principle, the Court provided a relatively comprehensive and 
familiar outline. The national courts were to consider “the whole of national law” in order to 
assess how far it can be applied in such a way as not to produce a result contrary to that 
envisaged by the framework decision13thereby reflecting the Pfeiffer14 case, which itself 
absorbed the Marleasing15 extension to interpretative duty to national provisions whether 
adopted before or after the relevant EU law. The “so far as possible” construction also 
reflects the Marleasing reformulation of the von Colson principle, and reminds us that 
national courts are ultimately its gatekeepers.  But the limits of what is possible are then 
articulated by the Court in what were by then familiar terms.16 First that the obligation is 
limited by the general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-
retroactivity. And more specifically still, “those principles prevent that obligation from 
leading to the criminal liability of persons who contravene the provisions of a framework 
decision from being determined or aggravated on the basis of such a decision alone, 
independently of an implementing law.”17 Later in the judgment the Court confirmed that 
the Framework Decision must be interpreted in such a way that fundamental rights, 
including in particular the right to a fair trial as set out in Article 6 of the Convention and 
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, are respected.18  
                                                          
11 Art 34 (2)(b) EU Treaty 
12 Pupino [62] 
13 Pupino [47] 
14 Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer and Others ECR [2004] I-8835 
15 Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA ECR [2004] I-8835  
16 Case 80/86, Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV ECR [1987] 3969 and C-212/04 Adeneler and others  ECR [2006] I-6057 
17 Pupino [44] and [45] 
18 Pupino [59] 
A second, familiar limit identified was that the obligation cannot serve as the basis for an 
interpretation of national law contra legem.19  In other words, the obligation on the national 
court ceases when the contents of the provision of national law are not open to 
interpretation in conformity with the norm of EU law. The national judges need only apply 
interpretative methods recognised by it and national law should not be improperly 
distorted; ultimately it is for the national judges to decide on what is possible.20 
Applying these limits to the query at issue in the case, the Court held that “the provisions 
which form the subject-matter of this reference for a preliminary ruling do not concern the 
extent of the criminal liability of the person concerned but the conduct of the proceedings 
and the means of taking evidence.”21 And in relation to the contra legem limitation the 
Court noted that it was “not obvious“ that an interpretation of national law in conformity 
with the framework decision is impossible, before finally conceding that it is for the national 
court to determine whether such a conforming interpretation is indeed possible.22 The 
upshot of all this was that EU law should be interpreted to enable special evidence 
gathering procedures to be used for children in Italian criminal trials, something that was 
not previously possible as a matter of national law.  
This case, reviewed extensively at the time, was a remarkable assertion of the constitutional 
quality and legal effects of a field of EU law that had retained significant features of inter-
governmentalism precisely because States wished to reflect the centrality of criminal justice 
issues to their own sovereign power. The explicit bar to framework decisions creating direct 
effect; the limited jurisdiction of the CJEU; the limited role of the European Parliament and 
the unanimity requirement to pass legislation were all distinctive features of the third pillar. 
Should EU level action in this field be capable of producing independent legal effects in the 
national context – all be they indirect - that would be a game changer in terms of the 
vertical power balance between the EU and states in relation to criminal law matters. 
Pupino was that game-changer. 
From an EU constitutional law perspective, this was another notable act of judicial 
constitutional activism on the part of the CJEU. Certainly, dubiety surrounded the legitimacy 
of the ruling given the pillar distinctions, the Court’s reasoning was subject to critique and 
interesting constitutional questions were pondered, such as whether the Community 
principles of supremacy and state liability might also apply to the third pillar.23 Cautious 
optimism was expressed to the extent that the principle of conforming interpretation might 
                                                          
19 Pupino [47]. By analogy with Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13, and Adeneler 
and Others, paragraph 110       
20 For an interesting exposition on the contra legem limit see M. Brenncke ‘Hybrid Methodology for the EU 
Principle of Consistent Interpretation’ (2017) Statute Law Review 
21 Pupino [46] 
22 Pupino [48] 
23 See for instance E. Spaventa, ibid; M. Fletcher, ‘Extending 'indirect effect' to the third pillar: the significance 
of Pupino?’ (2005) 30(6) European Law Review 862;  Spencer, J. 2005. Child witnesses and the EU. Cambridge 
Law Journal 64(3): 569;  
be a route to securing the protection of individual rights in the PJCC field and to the extent 
that the ruling enhanced judicial scrutiny over an EU field of co-operation with relatively 
impoverished democratic credentials.24  And we were reminded of the wider political 
context of the day, namely that the EU’s political actors and the Member States had already 
laid out a ‘Communitarised’ constitutional vision for the field of EU criminal in the then Draft 
Constitutional Treaty – the features of which would ultimately come to fruition in the Lisbon 
Treaty. It had been suggested that the Court was boldly flexing its transformative 
constitutional muscles25 at a time of gathering political storm clouds vis a vis the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, but it might equally have been the case that the Court in Pupino 
simply anticipated what it had reason to believe was going to happen in any case.26 
From another perspective, this ruling was seen as an entirely inappropriate incursion into 
sovereign territory, requiring well-established national criminal procedures to be revised at 
the behest of EU law. National constitutional courts among those enjoining the EU to tread 
carefully in this field. For instance in its judgment reaffirming the constitutionality of the act 
adopting the Lisbon Treaty 2007, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) observed that the 
European Union should proceed with caution given the potential encroachment on 
competences primarily reserved to the Member States on the basis of special constitutional 
sensitivity,  [including] “decisions on substantive and formal criminal law [and] on the 
disposition of the police monopoly on the use of force towards the interior…”.27   
The principle after Pupino, after Lisbon. 
As things transpired, the ‘pillarised’ critiques of- and queries arising from- Pupino lost their 
salience with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, as of 1 May 2009. But what did this 
mean for the application of the conforming interpretation principle to the PJCC sphere in 
practical terms?  It will be recalled that the Lisbon Treaty changes which were particularly 
transformative to the field of EU crime and policing both in terms of its substance and its 
constitutional framing. Most prominently, the pillar structure of the EU was ended and PJCC 
was incorporated into the TFEU complete with the application of many ‘Community law 
features’ to the field, including democratic and (full)28 judicial oversight by the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice, respectively.  Of particular note, another 
Communitarising feature introduced was that henceforth, the only legislative instruments to 
be adopted in the field of police and criminal law matters were to be the traditional 
Community  ‘directives’, replete with direct and indirect legal effect potential.29 What then 
of the already adopted third pillar framework decisions? They survived the entry into force 
                                                          
24 Fletcher and Spaventa, ibid. 
25 Fletcher 
26 E. Spaventa at 24 
27 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para 252–253. See B. Davies, ‘EU Criminal Law in National Courts: Breaking the 
Monopoly?’ (2013) Vol 34(3) Liverpool Law Review 241 
28 Protocol 36 Transitional arrangements  
29 Article 83 EU Treaty. 
of the Lisbon Treaty due to the Transitional Provisions in Protocol 36, according to which the 
legal effect of acts adopted pursuant to the third pillar before 1 May 2009 were ‘preserved 
until those acts are repealed, annulled or amended in implementation of the treaties.’30 So, 
framework decisions until such time as they are Lisbonised, would continue to lack direct 
effect, but be able to have indirect legal effects in a given national legal system a la Pupino. 
This has been confirmed by the Court in relation to enduring post Lisbon framework 
decisions as we will see in more detail below.31 The principle would almost certainly apply 
also following their amendment to, presumably, a directive.32  The extent to which such 
amending  (or repealing) directives acquire direct effect is more contested.33 However the 
principles of supremacy, direct effect and indirect effect would apply to any new post-
Lisbon legislative measures adopted in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.34 
The CJEU has, on a number of occasions since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
considered the legal effects of enduring Framework Decisions, including for the first time, 
mutual recognition instruments that are assumed to be underpinned by mutual trust 
between Member States. Compliance with the duty of conforming interpretation in this 
context might be more challenging for national judges as the limits of that mutual trust are 
exposed. Nonetheless, as we shall now see, in these cases, it has taken the opportunity to 
reiterate the principle of conforming interpretation in identical terms to cases previously 
handed down in different fields, so that it is fully absorbed into a single EU articulation of 
the principle.  
In ruling on the scope of a Member State to implement a ground for non-execution of the 
European arrest warrant,35 the Grand Chamber in Lopes Da Silva Jorge,36 reiterated the 
interpretative duty on national judges in these more expansive terms: the principle 
“requires national courts to do whatever lies within their jurisdiction, taking the whole body 
                                                          
30 Article 9 of Protocol (No 36) on transitional provisions, annexed to the EU treaties [2012] OJ C 326/322  
31 C-42/11 Lopes Da Silva Jorge [2011] ECR C103/16; C-554/14 Ognyanov [2015] ECR C73/17; the fullest 
summary of the principle in a case concerning EU criminal justice matters can be found in Case C-579/15 
Daniel Adam Popławski Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 29 June 2017 at paragraphs 26 – 36. All cases 
concerned mutual recognition instruments.  
32 The victims’ rights framework decision at issue in Pupino has now been replaced by Directive 2012/29/EU of 
25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, 
[2012] OJ L 315/57 
Note also that although the duty of consistent interpretation is most commonly applied in the context of 
directives, the duty also applies in relation to the EU Treaties, general principles of EU law, regulations, 
recommendations and potentially even to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. See Sim Haket, 
‘Coherence in the Application of the Duty of Consistent Interpretation in EU Law’ (2015) 8(2) Review of 
European Administrative Law 215 at fn 11 
33 H. Satzger, ‘Legal Effects of Directives Amending or Repealing Pre-Lisbon Framework Decisions’ (2015) 6(4) 
New Journal of European Criminal Law 528 
34 Steve Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (3rd edn, OUP, 2011) 42  
35 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1 
36 C-42/11 Lopes Da Silva Jorge [2011] ECR C103/16 
of domestic law into consideration and applying the interpretative methods recognised by 
it, with a view to ensuring that the framework decision in question is fully effective and to 
achieving an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by it.”   
In relation to the justificatory foundations of the principle we also see alignment with more 
recent cases on the principle of conforming interpretation. The Court in Lopes Da Silva Jorge 
justified the duty on national judges with reference first, to the “binding character” of 
framework decisions and second, by claiming that the duty “is inherent in the system of the 
TFEU, since it permits national courts, for matters within their jurisdiction, to ensure the full 
effectiveness of EU law when they determine the disputes before them.”37 
The first of these justifications – the binding nature of framework decisions  - can be found 
in Pupino. Missing now, of course, is the justificatory argument in Pupino connected to 
ensuring the effet utile of the limited third pillar preliminary reference jurisdiction; that 
being unnecessary given the extended judicial oversight introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Missing too, also logically, is the argument drawn from the implied intention on the part of 
the authors of the EU Treaty concerning the legal effect of framework decisions. More 
conspicuous  however, is the absence of any explicit reference to the principle of loyal 
cooperation as the foundation for the effectiveness argument, and hence the principle of 
conforming interpretation. It will be recalled that the pre-Lisbon principle of loyal or sincere 
cooperation has been a clear basis for the duty of consistent interpretation from its original 
development in Von Colson. Found only in Article 10 EC and therefore presumed by some to 
extend only to the Community pillar, the Court in Pupino, somewhat controversially,  ruled 
that it also applied in respect of  the third pillar, thus providing a by then well-established 
foundation for the extension of the principle of indirect effect. In its post Lisbon iteration38, 
the principle of loyalty now appears as a strengthened, reciprocal and general principle of 
‘sincere cooperation’39 between the Union and the Member States in Article 4 (3) Treaty on 
European Union, clearly applicable to all policy fields.40 Reference to it would have been 
easy and perhaps expected and yet it is not there.41 Instead the Court, as noted above, 
                                                          
37 Lopes Da Silva Jorge [53] and [54] 
38 Article 4(3 ) TEU reads ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives. 
39 Contrast with the more limited and one-way duty of Article 10 EC: ‘Member States shall take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community's tasks. They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty.’ 
40 Although note that a separate duty of cooperation is maintained in Article 24(3) TEU in specific relation to 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
41 Herlin-Karnell, reminds us that in the terrorist sanctions judgments of OMPI, Gestoras Pro Amenstia and 
Segio the notion of loyalty was recognised as being ‘especially binding’ in the third pillar. See Ester Herlin-
refers to the principle of conforming interpretation as being “inherent in the system of the 
TFEU…”  which first emerged in the Pfeiffer judgment (para 114) in relation to ensuring the 
full effectiveness of  Community Law and was extended to cover European Union law in the 
post-Lisbon case of Dominguez,42 concerning the working time directive. In Pfeiffer the duty 
of sincere cooperation was also explicitly recalled as a foundation for the duty of consistent 
interpretation whereas it did not appear in Dominguez. Are we to take it that sincere 
cooperation principle is still a central foundation for the duty but that it is now simply part 
of the ‘inherent in the system of the Treaty’ argument? It is not clear. On the one hand, its 
absence might be welcomed given the argued overreliance and ambiguous impact of the 
effet utile/effectiveness argument used by the Court as both an enforcement mechanism 
and a competence parameter.43 On the other hand, emphasising the importance of sincere 
cooperation in its fleshed out and reciprocal Lisbon version, might be of rejuvenated and 
richer value today, particularly in relation to EU criminal law, where there is a greater 
likelihood of, and potentially more at stake in terms of individual rights in, clashes between 
the EU and Member States. It is suggested that Article 4(3) TEU, especially when read with 
Article 4(2) TEU – the respect for national identities provision44 - provides a constitutional 
framework that allows for a more sophisticated development and understanding of criminal 
law at and by EU and national levels; it should be capable of embracing more than a narrow 
effet utile route to achieving – indeed, insisting on -  the coherence of EU law above all else. 
As promising as this might sound, it is also ambiguous, at least in the current stage of 
development of EU criminal law.  Perhaps, the Court is sensitive to this; nevertheless it still 
feels odd to eschew direct reference to the sincere cooperation duty as a primary rationale 
for the principle of conforming interpretation.  
In Ognyanov45concerning another instrument of mutual recognition, this time Framework 
Decision 2008/90946, the Grand Chamber pursued a similar alignment of the principle. Here, 
                                                          
Karnell, ‘In the wake of Pupino: Advocaten voor der Wereld and Dell’Orto’  (2007) 8(12) German Law Review 
1147 
42 C-282/10 Dominguez Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 24 January 2012 at [24]. For a critical 
commentary of this case, see M.De Mol, ‘Dominguez: a deafening silence’ (2012) 8(2) ECLRev 2012 280 
43 For a full exposition of this thesis in the context of EU criminal law, see E. Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional 
Dimension of European Criminal Law (Hart 2012) 
44 Introduce for the first time by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 4(2) TEU reads: ‘The Union shall respect the 
equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall 
respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law 
and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of 
each Member State.’ 
45 C-554/14 Ognyanov [2015] ECR C73/17 
46 Framework Decision 2009/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation 
of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the EU. [2009] OJ L327/27. In this case Bulgarian law 
governing the enforcement of criminal sentences, and its settled interpretation by the Bulgarian supreme 
court, allowed for a reduction in custodial sentence on account of work carried out by the sentenced person 
while detained in the issuing Member State. The relevant EU Framework Decision made no such provision for 
reduction of sentence. 
it confirmed that the duty on the national court arises from the date of expiry of 
implementation deadline identified in the Framework Decision by analogy with Adeneler.47 
It further confirmed that the requirement to interpret national law in conformity with EU 
law includes the expansive obligation, on all national courts, to alter, where necessary, 
settled case-law if that case-law is based on an interpretation of national law that is 
incompatible with the objectives of a framework decision.48 As such, the principle of 
consistent interpretation also requires that a lower national court disapplies, on its own 
authority, settled domestic case law achieved by the national court of last resort, if that 
case-law is not compatible with the objective of EU law. The Court further clarified that a 
contrary interpretative judgment cannot be the sole reason for claiming that an EU-
compatible interpretation is impossible.49 
An evaluation of the principle in the field of criminal law 
Having identified that the principle first established in Pupino has been absorbed into the 
mainstream understanding of the principle in EU law (as formerly developed in the 
Community context), this section briefly reflects on its peculiar challenges in the context of 
PJCC today and suggests that two recent cases offer some welcome developments and 
guidance to national judges on the limits of their interpretative duty to give effect to EU law.  
First, it is recalled that while the interpretative duty on national judges is broad, the precise 
scope of the stated limits to that duty are not foreseeable in every case, and ultimately the 
national judges themselves are the final arbiters as to whether an EU-friendly interpretation 
of national law is “possible”.50  As we have seen the CJEU has articulated two explicit limits 
to the principle of conforming interpretation and has apparently further directed national 
courts in more general terms as to the scope of what is possible; for instance that national 
legislation specifically implementing EU law should be capable of a conforming 
interpretation and a duty for lower courts to disapply rulings of higher courts. The Court in 
that sense reinforces the superiority of EU law within the confines of a plural system and 
encourages national courts to go to reach the outer limits of their scope in finding an 
interpretation that is compatible with EU law. Ultimately though, national judges sitting in 
courts across the length and breadth of the EU must determine whether an interpretation 
will be contra legem (further than possible) ostensibly based on a view as to the limits of 
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canons of construction/interpretation (understood to be) available to it. The extent to which 
there are or even can be objective limits to meaning and interpretation is surely relevant 
here.51 Certainly, wider pragmatic and socio-legal perspectives that emphasise other factors 
as determinative of the limits of the duty  (or indeed of engaging it at all) –are certainly 
persuasive. These have been noted to include legal cultural perspectives, power dynamics 
within the judiciary and between the judiciary and legislature. All of these might 
predetermine what are acceptable interpretations.52 And where significant constitutional 
norms are at put at risk by EU law, it is surely hardly surprising that national judges choose 
not to pursue the conforming interpretation duty.53  
What about the specific criminal liability proviso as a limit to the application of the 
principle? The well-established position that EU law cannot in and of itself either determine 
or aggravate the criminal liability of the individual, was reiterated by the Court in Pupino as 
a specific expression of the general principles limitation, of which the principles of legal 
certainty and non-retroactivity were highlighted.54 This extension to the field of PJCC puts 
the criminal liability proviso under the spotlight. As Spaventa pointed out in 2007, “in the 
Community law context, the application of the criminal liability exception has not proven to 
be particularly difficult nor particularly controversial. However, the transposition of the 
same doctrine in the field of co-operation in criminal matters might be more difficult, since 
the consistent interpretation in this field is more likely to centre on the interpretation of 
criminal law.” And, the Court’s particular finding on this proviso in Pupino arguably put it 
“under significant strain.”55  In essence the Court had indicated that where provisions of 
national law are procedural in nature, they could and should be interpreted so as to 
conform with framework decisions; in other words national rules on criminal procedure 
cannot ‘determine or aggravate’ criminal liability. This is contentious, as although such rules 
(for instance relating to evidence gathering or time limits for prosecution) are not 
constitutive of criminal liability, they might well determine the outcome of the case to the 
detriment of the defendant. Moreover, the particular constitutional value that is attributed 
by states to specific aspects of the criminal law can vary. The Court’s ruling on the liability 
proviso can consequently be read as imposing a particular and narrow understanding of the 
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The European Union as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Routledge, 2017) 137, 139 ff  
54 Pupino [44] and [45] 
55 B. Davies, fn 24, 253. Davies usefully highlights that the underpinning rationale for the liability proviso has 
varied in EU law and outlined why a more coherent logic is needed, and made more necessary by the 
expansion of EU competences and activity in the criminal law domain. 
principle of legality on national courts, that might well be at odds with the national 
conception of the same.  
So, if the question of what amounts to the determination and aggravation of criminal 
liability goes to the heart of fundamental safeguards that are recognised for individuals 
uniquely in the field of criminal justice and the EU’s conception of these safeguards 
(including within the specific scope of EU criminal justice) appears at odds with those of the 
States, is a national judge still required to interpret domestic law so as to achieve the 
objectives and obligations laid down in EU legislation?  A formal application of the principle 
of conforming interpretation viewed through a narrow effet utile/loyalty lens might elicit a 
positive response to this question, but some recent CJEU cases might be signalling 
otherwise, perhaps reflecting a greater comprehension on the part of the Court of the 
constitutional and criminal law sensitivities at stake.  
In Caronna, which concerned Directive 2001/83/EC on medicinal products for human use 
and the relevant national implementing law, the Court confirmed the interpretative limits of 
EU secondary law as lying in the determination or aggravation of criminal liability without a 
national legal basis. But in so doing, it also suggested that fundamental rights considerations 
trump the duty to interpret domestic law in conformity with secondary EU law obligations. 
It held that respect for the principle of legality as enshrined in Article 49 EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights would prevail even where national law is contrary to EU law and in so 
doing permitted the non-compliance of national law with an EU directive on fundamental 
rights grounds.56 
The Taricco saga57 is also worth a brief mention. This litigation before the CJEU and the 
Italian Constitutional Court has generated a number of fundamental questions about the 
relationship between European criminal law and national constitutional law and about the 
impact of EU law on domestic criminal justice systems.  It has been recognised that the 
ensuing dialogue between the two Courts has resulted in “a considerable of pragmatism and 
degree of mutual accommodation, while leaving a number of issues unresolved.”58 
In Taricco I the court, in ruling on compatibility of Italian law with the obligations of Member 
States pursuant to Article 325 (1) and (2) TFEU concerning the combatting of fraud affecting 
the financial interests of the EU, appeared to imply (as it had done in Pupino) that the 
principle of legality (Article 49 EUCFR) doesn’t apply in the context of national procedural 
rules pertaining to time limits for criminal prosecution. According to its autonomously 
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defined conception of the principle of legality, it therefore held simply that the Italian 
provisions on statute of limitation should be disapplied by national courts if they impede the 
effectiveness of protection of the financial interests of the EU.59 This was controversial, not 
least because a feature of the Italian legality principle was that it did also apply to limitation 
periods. In fact the disapplication of the provisions of national law by national judges would 
have breached the prohibition of retroactive effects (as for the crimes which had not been 
time-barred before the time the Taricco I judgment came out), the sufficient precision of 
criminal law, and the separation of powers. It is apparent that too much was left to national 
judges by this judgment, opening up the prospect of disparate application.60 These too high 
expectations on national courts to ‘cure’ national legislation from any incompatibilities with 
EU Law were apparently later ‘corrected’61 by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in Taricco II  - 
this time a reference from Italy’s Constitutional Court on the same matter - where the CJEU 
actually said “it is primarily for the national legislature to lay down rules on limitation that 
enable compliance with the obligations……[of EU law].”62 If nothing else this is a welcome 
acknowledgement that national judges can be put in very difficult situations by EU law; 
Situations that strain and disturb well-established national constitutional practices and 
potentially undermine rules and central tenets of national criminal law. In such 
circumstances it is just too simple to suggest that national judges are being ‘disobedient ’ or 
‘unfriendly’ towards the EU and the matter should not simply be viewed through a narrow 
EU loyalty and effet utile lens. In actual fact, the Italian constitutional court in Taricco II 
showed considerable respect to the EU by asking it for further guidance. It actively sought a 
more balanced and more directive judgment from the EU in light of domestic constitutional 
values and adopted language and style that was authoritative63 but not threatening. And the 
judgement of the CJEU ultimately did show deference to the domestic understanding of the 
scope of the principle of legal certainty. In light of that principle, it allowed Italian judges not 
to disapply the time-bar norms set out in national law which had previously been declared 
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incompatible with EU law by the CJEU in Taricco I. The Court here gave an indication of how 
to adapt the principle of legality to a multi-level governance system. The challenge is clear; 
in the absence of clarity and uniformity around policy and principles of the EU’s PJCC 
agenda, it must do enough to avoid overt clashes of authority while preserving, or rather 
accommodating pluralism. 
To summarise, the role of national judges to secure the indirect effect of EU criminal law 
must be understand within the wider setting of the as yet uncomfortable ‘fit’ between EU 
Law with the effet utile and internal coherence imperatives used to justify the extension of 
the principle and the national criminal law replete with its own internal coherence, 
peculiarities and sensitivities.64 While the consistent interpretation duty should be valued 
for its potential to neutralize or soften constitutional conflicts, and its recognition of the role 
of national judges as guardians of EU law, the degree, extent and cost of the asymmetries 
here is such that national judges cannot and should not be expected to offer anything like a 
comprehensive solution. And yet the developments identified in these cases might perhaps 
serve to embolden national judges to engage more readily with the duty of conforming 
interpretation and enable them to do so more easily.  
Conclusion 
Leaving aside the concerns relating to judicial activism and law-making on the part of the 
CJEU in Pupino, the upshot of the ruling at the time was that it brought national judiciaries 
into the picture at a time when judicial and democratic oversight of this area of law was 
woefully lacking. This was remarkable at the time because of the distinctiveness of the third 
pillar, but it was also broadly accepted by EU law scholars, even welcomed, as a mechanism 
through which individual rights might be upheld. Today, within the confines of markedly 
different constitutional setting, the Pupino principle endures in the PJCC field and has been 
fully aligned with the by now expansive duty of conforming interpretation developed in 
other fields of law. Far from these factors providing for a more legitimate and rights-based 
‘Europeanisation’ of criminal law which can be smoothly applied in domestic contexts with 
the minimum of interpretative gymnastics, in fact, a much more contentious picture 
prevails. The Pupino judgement gave us the first hint of the challenges that would lie ahead 
in term of the substantive clashes between EU law and national law  (particularly around the 
crucial question of individual rights and safeguards). In such a context, the conforming 
interpretation principle saddles national judges with a considerable and uncomfortable 
burden. Meanwhile the EU, and in particular the Luxembourg Judges, have the unenviable 
but (within the confines of the multi-level, supranational EU legal order) ultimately 
inevitable task of articulating more thoroughly the contours of EU criminal law and the legal 
relationship between the EU and national law.  There are some signs here that the CJEU 
recognises the uniqueness of domestic criminal law regimes and the fundamental principles 
and safeguards upon which they are built, and that the effective interpretation and 
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application of EU law – including via conforming interpretation of national law - is bound up 
with that. The challenges that fall to judges, at all levels, (probably inappropriately so) have 
arguably never been greater in the history of the EU; certainly the stakes have never been 
higher.  
